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The Battle to Define Asia’s Intellectual 
Property Law: From TPP to RCEP 
Anupam Chander* and Madhavi Sunder** 
A battle is under way to decide the intellectual property law for half 
the world’s population. A trade agreement that hopes to create a free 
trade area even larger than that forged by Genghis Khan will define 
intellectual property rules across much of Asia and the Pacific. The 
sixteen countries negotiating the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP) include China, India, Japan, and South Korea, 
and stretch to Australia and New Zealand. A review of a leaked draft 
reveals a struggle largely between India on one side and South Korea and 
Japan on the other over the intellectual property rules that will govern 
much of the world. The result of this struggle will affect not only access 
to innovation in the Asia-Pacific, but also across Africa and other parts 
of the world that depend on generic medicines from India, which has been 
called the “pharmacy to the developing world.” Surprisingly, the 
agreement that includes China as a pillar may result in stricter 
intellectual property rights than those mandated by the World Trade 
Organization’s Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS). Perhaps even more surprisingly, such 
TRIPS-plus rights will be available in the RCEP states to the United 
States and European companies equally by somewhat recondite 
provisions in TRIPS. In sum, the RCEP draft erodes access to 
medicines and education across much of the world. 
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Two competing mega-trade agreements seek to write the rules for intellectual 
property for half of the world. One agreement anchored till recently by the world’s 
largest economy, the United States, offers intellectual property rules that are 
generally stricter than those in the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). This treaty, the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), was negotiated by twelve nations—Australia, 
Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the 
United States, and Vietnam.1 When the United States pulled out, the remaining 
nations suspended a number of its provisions, especially those involving intellectual 
property, and proceeded with a treaty now dubbed the Comprehensive Progressive 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).2  
A second agreement, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(RCEP), anchored by the world’s second largest economy, China, is the focus of a 
struggle between those who seek stronger intellectual property rights and those who 
seek to carve out greater limitations and exceptions to intellectual property.3 Initially 
conceived by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which consists 
in Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, 
 
1. The Obama Administration’s description of the treaty is still available on the official 
government site. See The Trans-Pacific Partnership, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,  
https://ustr.gov/TPP/ [ https://perma.cc/Z738-TERN] (last visited June 14, 2018). 
2. New Zealand’s trade negotiators have detailed the suspended provisions. CPTPP Vs TPP, 
N.Z. FOREIGN AFF. & TRADE, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-
trade-agreements-concluded-but-not-in-force/cptpp/tpp-and-cptpp-the-differences-explained/ 
[ https://perma.cc/5EAV-UU2B] (last visited June 14, 2018). Because the agreement has been 
known popularly as the “TPP,” we will use that short form in the remaining paper, except where the 
text is known to differ between the TPP and the CPTPP. 
3. Seven states are members of both the TPP and RCEP groupings—Australia, Brunei, Japan, 
Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Vietnam. The RCEP would create history’s largest free trade 
zone, larger even than Genghis Khan’s. See JACK WEATHERFORD, GENGHIS KHAN AND THE MAKING 
OF THE MODERN WORLD xix (2004) (crediting Khan with creating “history’s largest free-trade zone”). 
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Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, the RCEP includes the six states with which 
ASEAN has existing free trade agreements, namely, Australia, China, India, Japan, 
New Zealand, and South Korea.4 Yet to be finalized, this agreement seeks to write 
the intellectual property rules that would govern the lives of nearly half of the 
world’s population and a third of the world’s gross domestic product.5  
Both treaties hope to ultimately attract many other countries, especially in 
Asia. The proponents of the TPP hope that it will lead to broader adoption in Asia 
and Latin America.6 The proponents of the RCEP too hope that it will serve as a 
stepping stone towards an even broader Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific. Before 
the exit of the United States from the TPP, the contest between the two mega-
regional agreements was often characterized as a struggle to bring the bulk of Asia 
into the American or the Chinese sphere of influence, as other states would vie for 
membership on terms that had already been decided by the original parties. But 
there is another crucial struggle that is almost entirely overlooked: a battle to define 
the intellectual property law for Asia in the twenty-first century. 
 
 
4. For a history of RCEP negotiations, see Peter K. Yu, The RCEP and Intellectual Property 
Normsetting in the Asia-Pacific, TEX. A&M U. SCH. L. LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER NUMBER 1774 (2017). 
5. James Love, 2015 Oct 16 Version: RCEP Draft Text for Investment Chapter, KNOWLEDGE 
ECOLOGY INT’L (April 22, 2016), https://www.keionline.org/23065 [ https://perma.cc/79EH-
73AQ] (“Collectively these sixteen countries have a population of 3,488,410,867 in 2014, which was 48 
percent of the world population of 7,260,710,677, according to the World Bank.”). 
6. From the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative: 
To that end, it contains clear rules and procedures for expanding participation to other 
countries that are able to fully implement and enforce the full range of TPP obligations. It 
also creates useful precedents for both broader Asia-Pacific economic integration and new 
initiatives that could revitalize plurilateral and multilateral trade talks in the WTO. 
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR 
TRADE POLICY AND NEGOTIATIONS 5 (2015). The TPP’s proponents hope to ultimately include other 
countries in Latin America as well: “It will encourage the further evolution of free markets in Latin 
America through the inclusion of Chile and Peru and possibly others going forward.” Id. at 6. 
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Figure 1. Map of TPP and RCEP countries 
 
Indeed, while the TPP has drawn the bulk of attention in the United States, it 
is the negotiations within the RCEP that might ultimately have the greatest impact. 
This is because of two reasons. First, unlike the TPP, the RCEP includes both China 
and India—the world’s most populous countries—and will define intellectual 
property rights for half the world’s population. Despite Asia’s recent astonishing 
economic advances, the region still holds a startlingly enormous number of the 
world’s poor, sick, and uneducated.7 Intellectual property protections can indeed 
help spur medical advances and authorship, but they can also put medicines and 
textbooks out of the reach of billions of people. Second, India’s intellectual property 
law and its ability to export medicines to other nations literally affect life and death 
across the world. South Africa’s Health Minister, Aaron Motsoaledi, has called India 
the “pharmacy to the developing world.”8 India’s role as the provider of affordable, 
life-saving medicines for the developing world stands at risk, and depends on the 
results of this obscure and secret negotiation. 
A leaked version of the RCEP intellectual property chapter, then, deserves 
careful study. The draft includes text that seems to be agreed on by all parties, as 
well as proposals, oppositions, and counterproposals with respect to language that 
is yet being negotiated.9 The leaked text tells us which countries are proposing or 
rejecting any particular controversial language, and thus gives us a unique glimpse 
 
7. See infra notes 22–23 and accompanying text. 
8. Vidya Krishnan & Mandakini Gahlot, Why South Africa’s Health Minister Is So Worried 
About India Caving in to Big Pharma, SCROLL.IN, Aug. 10, 2015, https://scroll.in/article/745344/why-
south-africas-health-minister-is-so-worried-about-india-caving-in-to-big-pharma [ https://perma.cc/ 
YH54-X3SR]. 
9. Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Free Trade Agreement, Single Working 
Document on the Intellectual Property Chapter. 
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into the process of international lawmaking.10 Of course, leaked texts are not 
necessarily accurate, but, lacking any alternative, we will proceed as though they are, 
with the caveat that they have not been officially acknowledged as accurate. We add 
another caution: the text has likely progressed beyond the October 2015 version, as 
there have been additional negotiating rounds since then. 
Not only is a study of the RCEP intellectual property chapter revealing 
because of its real-world consequences for access to medicines and access to 
knowledge, the study of the text also sheds light on fundamental theoretical 
inquiries about international lawmaking. What will a largely South-South intellectual 
property agreement look like? Do the local advanced nations—here Japan and 
South Korea—simply substitute for the Western metropole in a North-South 
agreement? Does an Asian trade agreement anchored by China and India reflect so-
called “Asian Values” in any way? 
Most strikingly, we conclude that the intellectual property chapter of the 
Asian-Pacific agreement would, if certain proposals are adopted, largely work to the 
benefit of United States and European enterprises. While the ratification of TRIPS 
by the developing world can be understood as simply concessions to gain better 
access to Western markets for developing country products, that rationale is absent 
here. Despite having been negotiated in the Asia-Pacific, the RCEP’s intellectual 
property chapter may turn out to be largely a copy-and-paste job based on Western 
agreements.11 
We proceed below as follows. Part I offers the core of our argument—that 
proposed intellectual property provisions in the RCEP are a threat to health and 
education worldwide by establishing TRIPS-plus obligations throughout the Asia-
Pacific. Part II offers the most surprising insight in the Article—that these TRIPS-
plus obligations negotiated among the largest Asian countries will principally benefit 
United States and European multinationals. Part III then evaluates aspects of the 
treaty-making process, specifically the claim that governments are rational national 
interest maximizers and that trade negotiations should remain secret. A short 
conclusion suggests that the RCEP intellectual property chapter should either be 
withdrawn or rewritten. 
 
10. Id. 
11. The copying is at times literal, as can be seen in the following example. The TPP provides: 
No Party shall require, as a condition of registration, that a sign be visually perceptible, nor 
shall a Party deny registration of a trademark only on the ground that the sign of which it is 
composed is a sound. Additionally, each Party shall make best efforts to register scent marks. 
Trans-Pacific Partnership art. 18.18, February 4, 2016, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-
Final-Text-Intellectual-Property.pdf [ https://perma.cc/7NBU-JP75] [ hereinafter TPP] (similar text 
appears in prior United States free trade agreements, such as the United States Korea Free Trade 
Agreement, art. 18.2.). The RCEP draft offers, “No Party shall require, as a condition of registration, 
that trademarks be visually perceptible, nor deny registration of a trademark solely on the grounds that 
the sign of which it is composed is a sound [ JP/NZ/CN/KR/IN oppose: or a scent].” RCEP Draft, 
art. 3.1.2. This provision goes beyond TRIPS, which states to the contrary that “Members may require, 
as a condition of registration, that signs be visually perceptible.” TRIPS, art. 15(1). 
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I. THREATS TO HEALTH AND EDUCATION 
While there have been international intellectual property treaties stretching 
back into the nineteenth century, it was only with the advent of the WTO, in 1995, 
that international intellectual property law gained both widespread acceptance and 
enforceable rules. Indeed, the United States only came to implement the Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works in 1989 during the 
WTO negotiations, more than a century after its initial adoption in 1886.12  
Peter Yu has described the TRIPS agreement as an “international enclosure 
movement . . . requiring nations to adopt one-size-fits-all legal standards that ignore 
their local needs, national interests, technological capabilities, and public health 
conditions.”13 Even if TRIPS may not be ideal from the perspective of developing 
countries, TRIPS does include important flexibilities for policy choices on 
intellectual property within nations. Experts advise developing countries to exercise 
fully the flexibilities within TRIPS.14 Over the intervening years since 1995, 
however, developed states have sought to close some of those loopholes through 
what have become known as “TRIPS-plus” provisions in bilateral and regional free 
trade agreements.15 The United Nations Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on 
Access to Medicines has, however, cautioned that such TRIPS-plus agreements 
“may impede access to health technologies.”16 
 
12. See U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, OUR RIGHT TO KNOWLEDGE: LEGAL REVIEWS FOR THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE MARRAKESH TREATY FOR PERSONS WITH PRINT DISABILITIES IN ASIA AND 
THE PACIFIC viii (2015). 
13. Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827, 828 (2007); see also 
Molly Land, Rebalancing TRIPS, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 433, 435–36 (2012). 
14. COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY (2002), http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/text/final_ 
report/execsumhtmfinal.htm [ https://perma.cc/ZJ86-F7VU] (“TRIPS allows considerable flexibility 
in how countries may design their patent systems. Since most developing countries do not have a 
significant research capability, they have little to gain by providing extensive patent protection as a 
means of encouraging research, but they stand to lose as a result of the impact of patents on prices. 
Therefore developing countries should aim for strict standards of patentability to avoid granting patents 
that may have limited value in relation to their health objectives. . . . For instance, most developing 
countries should exclude diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods from patentability, including new 
uses of known products, as permitted under TRIPS. Developing countries should also make provisions 
in their law that will facilitate the entry of generic competitors as soon as the patent has expired on a 
particular drug.”). 
15. Cynthia M. Ho, An Overview of “TRIPS-Plus” Standards, in ACCESS TO MEDICINE IN THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMY: INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON PATENTS AND RELATED RIGHTS 223, 223 
(2011). 
16. UNITED NATIONS SEC’Y-GEN.’S HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON ACCESS TO MEDS., ACCESS TO 
MEDICINES REPORT: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND ACCESS TO HEALTH TECHNOLOGIES (2016), 
http://www.unsgaccessmeds.org/final-report/ [ https://perma.cc/BB7G-QY3G]. The Special 
Rapporteur on the right of health also called on countries to avoid TRIPS-plus commitments in their 
laws and treaties. Anand Grover (Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of 
the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health), Promotion and Protection of All  
Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development,  
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/12 (Mar. 31, 2009). 
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This is a charge leveled, for example, against the TPP, with its United States-
led effort to impose stricter intellectual property rules on countries like Vietnam. 
The TPP, for example, “obligates Vietnam to recognize IP rights for biologics,”17 
and increases copyright term lengths from fifty years after the death of the author 
or performer to seventy years after the death of the author or performer.18 
The RCEP, however, has been negotiated entirely within Asia-Pacific nations, 
outside the pressures brought to bear by the United States. But even within the 
Asia-Pacific region, there are countries that see a future in receiving royalties for 
intellectual property. Within the sixteen RCEP nations, Japan and South Korea are 
long-standing, significant international intellectual property powers, with China 
emerging as a new international intellectual property power, and India occupying a 
middle role as an exporter of Bollywood movies.19 Both India and China are among 
what Peter Yu calls the “Middle Intellectual Property Powers”—which include 
Brazil, Russia, South Africa, and Thailand.20 
Even these middle-income powers must be cautious in embracing ever 
stronger intellectual property rights. India is a major importer of patented 
inventions, Hollywood movies, and foreign English-language books, and its 
generics industry depends, as we shall see, on both domestic standards of 
patentability and an ability to export.21 Despite the immense strides in reducing 
poverty that they have made over the last few decades, many RCEP countries still 
face widespread and dire poverty. Figure 2 below sets out poverty statistics for the 
RCEP member states. The RCEP states hold more than 400 million people who 














17. MICHAEL F. MARTIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41550, U.S.-VIETNAM ECONOMIC AND 
TRADE RELATIONS: ISSUES FOR THE 114TH CONGRESS 5 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/ 
row/R41550.pdf [ https://perma.cc/P9DV-N7VG]. 
18. Id. at 10. 
19. Yu, supra note 4. 
20. Peter K. Yu, The Middle Intellectual Property Powers, in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT OF 
MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES 84, 89–91 (Randall Peerenboom & Tom Ginsburg eds., 2014). 
21. Id. 
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Figure 2. Extremely Poor Persons in RCEP Region22 
 





Cambodia 14,832,255 300,000 3,200,000 
China 1,350,695,000 87,300,000 257,300,000 
India 1,247,446,011 268,000,000 731,900,000 
Indonesia 248,037,853 29,200,000 103,400,000 
Laos 6,473,050 1,100,000 3,000,000 
Philippines 96,017,322 12,600,000 36,100,000 
Thailand 67,164,130 0 800,000 
Vietnam 88,809,200 2,900,000 12,300,000 
TOTAL 3,298,786,504 401,400,000 1,148,000,000 
 
Three RCEP negotiating parties—Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar—are 
themselves classified as Least Developed Countries (LDCs) by the United Nations. 
Should the agreement be expanded to neighboring countries, it could include almost 
a dozen more Least Developed Countries: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
Kiribati, Nepal, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Yemen.23 The 
RCEP will effectively write the intellectual property law of some of the very poorest 
countries in the world. 
Health costs, of course, are not the concern of the poorest alone. Many 
countries in the region have increasing obligations to care for aging populations. 
Aging populations mean increased demand for health technologies. Even though 
South Korea and Japan are major intellectual property powers, they have two of the 
world’s most rapidly aging societies, and thus stand to become significant importers 
of medicines and other intellectual property. As Figure 3 shows, more than a quarter 
of Japan’s population is already aged sixty-five or older, far higher than the 15% and 
13% share of the United States’ and South Korean populations, respectively.24 In 
 
22. These are 2012 statistics, except for India, which is for 2011; all figures are adjusted for 
Purchasing Power Parity—World Bank statistics. No figures provided for Brunei, Japan, Myanmar, 
New Zealand, Singapore, or South Korea. For Thailand, the number of persons at $1.90/day is given 
as zero because of rounding. 
23. U.N. COMM. FOR DEV. POLICY, LIST OF LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (AS OF  
MARCH 2018) (2018), https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/
publication/ldc_list.pdf [ https://perma.cc/B9MH-WJ8K]. 
24. DataBank: World Development Indicators, WORLD BANK, http://databank.worldbank.org/
data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators&preview=on [ https://perma.cc/H7R9-
8JYQ] ( last visited July 30, 2017). 
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Japan, “[D]eaths have outpaced births for several years.”25 By 2050, Japan expects 
fully 39% of its citizens to be aged sixty-five or older.26 
 




Unless Japan or South Korea are confident that they will supply all the 
medicines that their populations need, they may reduce their own access to 
diagnostic tools or generic versions of medicines or other therapies pioneered in 
other states.28 Japan’s share of world imports of medicine grew from Japan 24 3.7 
to 4.4 percent from 2010 to 2015 by value, even as its share of world exports fell 
from 0.9 percent to 0.7 percent during the same period.29 
 
25. Jonathan Soble, Japan, Short on Babies, Reaches a Worrisome Milestone, N.Y. TIMES,  
June 2, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/02/business/japan-population-births.html 
[ https://web.archive.org/web/20180407161153/https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/02/business/ 
japan-population-births.html]. 
26. Dallin Jack, The Issue of Japan’s Aging Population (Law Sch. Int’l Immersion  
Program Papers, Working Paper No. 8, 2016), https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/
international_immersion_program_papers/35/ [ https://perma.cc/7KGY-6PET] (citing Japan’s 
CABINET BUREAU OF STATISTICS, STATISTICAL HANDBOOK OF JAPAN 2015: CHAPTER  
2—POPULATION (2016), http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/nenkan/pdf/yhyou02.pdf 
[ https://perma.cc/YW7V-BPCA]). 
27. DataBank: Population Estimates and Projections , WORLD BANK,  
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=population-estimates-and-projections 
[ https://perma.cc/3KGU-A63S] (last visited Jan. 31, 2018). 
28. The United States government’s own studies list Japan as the number one pharmaceutical 
export market prospect in the near-term. INT’L TRADE ADMIN., 2016 ITA PHARMACEUTICALS  
TOP MARKETS REPORT 2 (2016), https://www.trade.gov/topmarkets/pdf/Pharmaceuticals_ 
Executive_Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/4L86-8TRV]. 
29. WORLD TRADE ORG., TABLE A19: TOP 10 EXPORTERS AND IMPORTERS OF 
PHARMACEUTICALS, 2015 (2015), https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/wts2016_e/wts16_ 
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The RCEP would also rewrite global copyright rules for Asia, affecting the 
ability of nations to access the copyrighted cultural and technical knowledge that is 
critical for national economic development. While proponents of strong intellectual 
property rights in copyrights and patents argue that such rights promote innovation, 
developing countries often find it difficult to develop other aspects of a successful 
innovation environment, such as a population educated in the latest cultural and 
technical knowhow, capital for research and development, and resources for 
marketing. In its current form, the RCEP proposes strong copyright protections 
without correspondingly robust exceptions and limitations that would ensure access 
to textbooks and other educational materials at affordable prices in developing 
countries. As Ruth L. Okediji has argued, “[C]oncepts of literacy should extend 
beyond the mere ability to read. Technological, social and cultural literacy are key 
components of a country’s productive capacity in the digital economy.”30 
Unfortunately, the RCEP is not alone; global copyright law as a whole has largely 
failed to mandate copyright exceptions and limitations designed to promote the 
economic, social, and cultural needs of developing countries.31 The exceptions and 
limitations that exist predominately reflect the values of developed countries, 
focusing on personal liberties to use, rather than distributional concerns about 
access to knowledge and knowledge goods.32 The RCEP, which would affect so 
many of the world’s poor, must strengthen its provisions for copyright exceptions 
and limitations to promote the ability of developing countries to educate their 
populations and provide the critical knowledge tools needed to absorb technology, 
data, and culture as necessary to succeed in the new global economy. 
In short, Asia faces multiple critical, interrelated crises impacted by the 
contours of intellectual property rights: dire poverty, widespread morbidity, an aging 
population, and the need to improve the educational attainment of its population. 
We turn now to analyzing the RCEP provisions impacting these crises. 
A. Access to Medicines 
The RCEP has the potential to severely restrict access to essential medicines 
for the world’s poor. According to the latest leaked draft, proposals in the RCEP33 
 
30. Ruth L. Okediji, Reframing International Copyright Limitations and Exceptions as Development 
Policy, in COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 429, 462 (Ruth L. Okediji 
ed., 2017). 
31. See id. at 464–65 (describing failure of Stockholm Protocol of 1967, which sought to 
promote bulk access to copyrighted works through compulsory licenses in developing countries for 
educational purposes); id. at 480 (noting that “development-inducing L&Es must differ in kind, in scale, 
and in form”); id. at 483 (“If copyright law is to have an important role in promoting economic growth 
and development, it has to look different in developing countries.”). 
32. Okediji observes that exceptions related to teaching and translations are relevant to 
developing countries; other exceptions and limitations are largely biased toward developed country 
needs and values. See id. at 481. 
33. The TPP would go further yet by requiring a low standard of patentability that would allow 
patents for mere modifications and tweaks. Naina Singh et al., Influence of Patent Law on Price of 
Medicines: A Comparative Analysis of Various Countries, in PATENT LAW AND INTELLECTUAL 
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would (1) extend patent terms to compensate for delays34 in granting patents or in 
obtaining marketing approval;35 (2) adopt new exclusive rights in clinical-trial data;36 
(3) potentially reject flexibilities, provisions for compulsory licenses and extensions 
for deadlines to reform pharmaceutical patent laws in Least Developed Countries; 
(4) adopt TRIPS-plus border measures; and (5) adopt investor-state dispute 
resolution process that would create state liability for regulating IP to promote 
public health. These provisions in the RCEP are particularly risky because they 
would negatively affect India, the largest global supplier of generic medicines, 
thereby significantly affecting access to essential medicines in Africa, Latin America, 
and other parts of the developing world. These are not the only provisions in the 
RCEP draft that may prove problematic, but are illustrative of the kinds of concerns 
raised by the draft. We consider these five provisions in further detail below. 
First, Japan and South Korea seek an extension of a patent term for 
pharmaceuticals to compensate for the time needed to obtain marketing 
approvals.37 This language is stronger than the TPP, which limits such extensions 
to cases of “unreasonable curtailment” of the effective patent term.38 Additionally, 
South Korea proposes to extend the patent terms in the case of “unreasonable 
delays” in the granting of the patent itself, though India, China, and ASEAN oppose 
this, joined in this case by Japan.39 
Second, the leaked draft proposes data exclusivity for drug companies, 
protecting clinical trial data needed for regulatory approval in addition to the 
patented drugs themselves, thereby making generic drug production much more 
onerous.40 Japan and South Korea seek to slow competition from generics by 
preventing the use for five years (counting from the date of approval) of data 
 
PROPERTY IN THE MEDICAL FIELD 20, 31 (Rashmi Aggarwal & Rajinder Kaur eds., 2017) (explaining 
that TPP requires patents for “[n]ew uses of a known product; [n]ew methods of using a known 
product; [o]r new processes of using a known product”). Lower patentability standards allow for more 
patents and longer patents—hence the name “evergreen” patent. Innovators can go for low hanging 
fruit—extensions on existing patents—rather than focus on breakthrough inventions with proven 
therapeutic benefits. See Brook K. Baker, Trans-Pacific Partnership Provisions in Intellectual Property, 
Transparency, and Investment Chapters Threaten Access to Medicines in the US and Elsewhere, 13 PLOS 
MED. 1, 3 (2016). 
34. Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership art. 5.13.3 [hereinafter RCEP] (“Each 
Party, at the request of the patent owner, shall adjust the term of a patent to compensate for 
unreasonable delays that occur in granting the patent.”). 
35. Id. art. 5.13.1 (“With respect to the patent which is granted for an invention related to 
pharmaceutical products, each Party shall, subject to the terms and conditions of its applicable laws and 
regulations, provide for a compensatory term of protection for any period during which the patented 
invention cannot be worked due to marketing approval process.”). 
36. Id. art. 5.16. 
37. Id. art. 5.13.1. 
38. TPP, supra note 11, art. 18.48. 
39. RCEP, supra note 34, art. 5.13.3 (“[A]n unreasonable delay shall at least include a delay in 
the issuance of the patent of more than four years from the date of filing of the application in the 
territory of the Party, or three years after a request for examination of the application, whichever is 
later. Periods attributable to actions of the patent applicant need not be included in the determination 
of such delays.”). 
40. Id. art. 5.16. 
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provided by the first applicant for marketing approval—the precise term of data 
exclusivity agreed to in the original TPP.41 The CPTPP suspends this provision of 
the original TPP.42 Unlike the original TPP, the RCEP does not include sui generis 
protections for the new class of medicines known as biologics, but the other 
protections available for medicines would likely apply to this class of drugs.43 The 
special protection for biologics, too, has been suspended in the CPTPP.44 Thus, if 
they wish to enter the market for a particular drug in a timely fashion, generic drug 
makers would have to invest in their own expensive and time-consuming drug trials 
before production—wastefully repeating the work already performed. Both patent 
term extensions and data exclusivity ultimately have effect of delaying the market 
entry of generic medicines and increasing public health costs for governments. 
Third, Japan and South Korea oppose Article 5.7 of the RCEP, proposed by 
ASEAN, India, New Zealand, and China, which recognizes “TRIPS Flexibilities for 
Compulsory Licenses and LDC Extensions.”45 Currently, the WTO has pushed 
back the date for Least Developed Countries’ compliance with TRIPS provisions 
regarding pharmaceuticals to 2033.46 Japan and South Korea thus appear ready to 
abandon support for widely accepted TRIPS flexibilities, even those that would only 
target the very poorest countries in the world. 
Fourth, while TRIPS explicitly excludes the requirement to police goods in 
transit,47 the RCEP reintroduces this issue, though in a moderate form. The text 
reads: “The Parties shall cooperate on border measures [ JP propose; ASN/IN 
oppose: such as exchanging information which is conducive to identification of 
suspects in importation, exportation or transit] with a view to eliminating trade 
which infringes intellectual property rights.”48 Even though India opposes the 
references to “transit” favored by Japan, it has not registered opposition to the more 
general requirement to cooperate on eliminating trade infringing on intellectual 
property rights.49 Any understanding of this provision that subsumes transit 
potentially jeopardizes the transfer of medicines from one developing country 
(where they are legal to manufacture) to another developing country (where they 
are legal to sell) if they pass through a country that declares those medicines 
infringing. 
 
41. TPP, supra note 11, art. 18.50; RCEP, supra note 34, art. 5.16. 
42. N.Z. FOREIGN AFF. & TRADE, supra note 2 (suspending art. 18.50 of the original TPP). 
43. Carlos Christopher Smith Díaz, Delving into the Fog of Ambiguity: An Analysis of the Trans-
Pacific Partnership’s Data Exclusivity Provisions and Their Implications for Access to Medicines in New 
Zealand, 48 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 1 (2017). 
44. N.Z. FOREIGN AFF. & TRADE, supra note 2. 
45. RCEP, supra note 34, art. 5.7. 
46. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 66, April 15, 1994 
[ hereinafter TRIPS]. 
47. TRIPS, supra note 46, art. 51 n.13 (“It is understood that there shall be no obligation to 
apply such procedures to imports of goods put on the market in another country by or with the consent 
of the right holder, or to goods in transit.”). 
48. RCEP, supra note 34, art. 10.2.3. 
49. Id. 
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Finally, the RCEP includes an investor-state dispute resolution provision that 
would allow ordinary regulatory actions of states to protect public health to be 
challenged for violating a foreign investor’s intellectual property rights. The draft of 
RCEP’s investment chapter places intellectual property within the investor-state 
dispute resolution system, with a narrow exclusion for limitations or incursions on 
intellectual property rights only where they are consistent with RCEP’s intellectual 
property provisions.50 The traditional remedy for a country’s failure to enact and 
enforce intellectual property provisions in a trade agreement is to require that 
country to bring its regulations into compliance after a dispute resolution 
proceeding conducted between states.51 An alternative, and potentially far more 
expansive and expensive, remedy emerges through the investment chapters in free 
trade agreements or bilateral investment treaties. Such chapters can permit a foreign 
company to bring an arbitration claim against a country for compromising the value 
of its intellectual property in the country. The RCEP draft appears poised to bring 
intellectual property claims before the purview of the investor-state dispute 
resolution system, thereby permitting foreign intellectual property holders to claim 
that a national or local government had improperly expropriated their investment. 
The draft text includes both “direct or indirect” expropriation, permitting a claim 
when a “government action interferes with distinct, reasonable investment-backed 
expectations.”52 “[C]overed investments” subject to the investment chapter 
specifically include intellectual property.53 India has no objection to including 
intellectual property within the ambit of investor-state dispute resolution,54 nor for 
that matter does China.55 
Seen from one perspective, there is nothing remarkable about recognizing 
intellectual property as a valuable investment in a country, which can accordingly 
be expropriated. But by moving intellectual property violations of a trade agreement 
into investor-state dispute resolution, intellectual property receives far stronger 
protection than the goods and services rules that are the core of trade agreements. 
 
50. RCEP, supra note 34, art. 5: 
This Article [A, Au, C, J, K, NZ: does] not apply to the issuance of compulsory licenses 
granted in relation to intellectual property rights, [Au, C, J, K, NZ: in accordance with the 
TRIPS Agreement,] or to the revocation, limitation, or creation of intellectual property 
rights, to the extent that such issuance, revocation, limitation, or creation is consistent with 
[A, Au, J, K, NZ: Chapter XX (Intellectual Property Rights)] [A, Au, J: and] [A, Au, C, J, the 
TRIPS Agreement] [A, Au: 7]. 
51. This is the standard remedy for TRIPS violations, for example. If a country fails to comply 
with an adverse ruling, the dispute settlement body can authorize retaliatory removals of trade 
concessions, or, far more rarely, the nations can settle the matter through the negotiation. See KEITH 
E. MASKUS, PRIVATE RIGHTS AND PUBLIC PROBLEMS: THE GLOBAL ECONOMICS OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 109 (2012) (describing United States-European 
Union settlement following United States failure to comply with adverse TRIPS ruling in cases involving 
public performance in business venues). 
52. RCEP, supra note 34, art. 5. 
53. Id. 
54. RCEP DRAFT INVESTMENT TEXT INDIA art. 5 (2015). India has proposed a similar 
investment chapter. 
55. RCEP DRAFT INVESTMENT TEXT: CHINA art. 5 (2015). 
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Violations of liberalization commitments for goods or services only carry the 
possibility of retaliatory reinstatement of trade barriers, not extensive damages paid 
from the national coffers. Furthermore, goods and services violation claims can only 
be brought by states, not by the adversely-affected enterprises themselves.56 The 
RCEP will thus result in more, and larger, intellectual property claims. 
Recent investor-state dispute resolution cases demonstrate the types of 
intellectual property claims that might be brought, and even reveal the risks they 
present for health. Phillip Morris brought claims against Uruguay and Australia for 
public health-related cigarette packaging requirements that interfered with its use of 
its trademarks, seeking some $22 million plus compound interest from Uruguay. Eli 
Lilly brought an arbitral claim against Canada after a Canadian court invalidated its 
patent on the drug Straterra.57 Eli Lilly sought damages of $500 million from Canada 
for denying patent rights to this drug and another drug, Zyprexa.58 Defending such 
a claim can be quite expensive. When a tribunal at the International Center for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) dismissed all claims brought by Phillip 
Morris against Uruguay, the tribunal ordered the company “to pay Uruguay US$7 
million as partial reimbursement of the country’s legal expenses.”59 Had Uruguay 
lost, it might have had to pay Phillip Morris’s legal fees, as requested by Phillip 
Morris.60 While these cases have not yet proven successful, similar cases may yet 
prove successful in the future—and they also send a “regulatory chill . . . on efforts 
by states to regulate IP industries,” as James Gathii and Cynthia Ho have observed.61 
In sum, despite some agreement on the investor-state dispute resolution, the 
RCEP is the site of several disputes largely between Japan and South Korea, on the 
one hand, and India on the other, over the ability of India to continue to produce 
generic medicines for the poor. As evidenced from the leaked draft, India, joined 
often by various other RCEP partners, has sought to rebuff Japanese and South 
Korean demands.62 
 
56. Kohshi Arnold Itagaki, Note, Private Party Standing in the WTO: Towards 
Judicialization of WTO Decisions in U.S. Courts, 45 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1265, 1267–68 (2014) (“One of the 
key characteristics of the WTO dispute settlement system is that only member states (i.e., countries 
signed onto the WTO) are permitted to initiate disputes.”). 
57. Harold Hongju Koh, Global Tobacco Control as a Health and Human Rights Imperative, 
57 HARV. INT’L L.J. 433 (2016); Sergio Puig, Tobacco Litigation in International Courts, 57 HARV. J. INT’L 
L. (2016); Recent International Decision, Philip Morris Brands Sàrl v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, 130 
HARV. L. REV. 1986 (2017). 
58. James Gathii & Cynthia Ho, Regime Shifting of IP Lawmaking and Enforcement from the 
WTO to the International Investment Regime, 18 Minn. J.L. Sci. & Tech. 427, 456 (2017). 
59. Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A., and Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental 
Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award, ¶ 592 ( July 8, 2016) (dismissing all claims 
and holding that Uruguay is to receive $7 million in United States dollars reimbursement). 
60. Id. (describing Phillip Morris seeking payment for “all of their fees and expenses, including 
attorney’s fees, incurred in connection with this arbitration,” in addition to damages and other 
appropriate relief ). 
61. Gathii & Ho, supra note 58, at 434. 
62. RCEP, supra note 34, art. 5. 
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Public health advocates around the world have urged India not to forsake the 
world’s poor as it negotiates the RCEP not only on behalf of its own citizens and 
corporations, but also on behalf of nations across the world in the RCEP 
negotiations. The non-profit group Doctors Without Borders estimates that nearly 
80% of all antiretrovirals used in Africa come from India.63 South African Health 
Minister Aaron Motsoaledi has urged India to reject changes that would erode its 
ability to supply generic medicines stating, “My message to India is that we really 
rely on them and if they reverse their position now they will end up killing a lot of 
people in Africa . . . .”64 India had been particularly critical to South Africa’s battle 
against AIDS, which by 2001 had become the leading cause of death in that 
country.65 That year, Yusuf Hamied, the chairman of Cipla Pharmaceuticals, India’s 
largest generic drug maker, announced a generic version of antiretrovirals that 
would cost less than $1 a day.66 Remarkably, the availability of the Indian generics 
brought the price of first-generation AIDS drugs down by 99%.67 “These medicines 
helped the price of HIV treatment in South Africa make the incredible drop from 
more than $10,000 a person a year in 2000 to just over $100 in 2016. This has 
enabled more than 17 million people in the developing world to receive HIV 
treatment,” says Claire Waterhouse of Doctors Without Borders (also known as 
Médecins Sans Frontières or MSF). “Today, 97% of the medicines Doctors Without 
Borders (MSF) uses to treat nearly 230,000 people with HIV are generic 
antiretrovirals from India,” she observes.68 
The key to India’s rise as a generic drug powerhouse was a crucial reform to 
India’s patent law in 1970. The 1911 colonial-era patent statute had required patents 
in all fields in technology and in drug products and processes.69 After Indian 
Independence, a study of the social and economic effects of the patent law 
concluded that the colonial law was not tailored to promote India’s economic or 
humanitarian interests as its chief beneficiaries were foreigners, who outnumbered 
Indians nine to one in obtaining patents.70 At the same time, the benefits of 
innovation were being priced out of the reach of most Indians, who were too poor 
to pay monopoly prices on medicines. “Patent systems,” Indian Supreme Court 
 
63. Krishnan & Gahlot, supra note 8. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. Donald G. McNeil Jr., Indian Company Offers to Supply AIDS Drugs at Low Cost in Africa, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/07/world/indian-company-offers- 
to-supply-aids-drugs-at-low-cost-in-africa.html [ https://web.archive.org/web/20180530073857/ 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/07/world/indian-company-offers-to-supply-aids-drugs-at-low-
cost-in-africa.html]. 
67. Claire Waterhouse, South Africa Must Stand Firm with India – the Pharmacy of the Developing 
World, BHEKISISA, July 7, 2016, http://bhekisisa.org/article/2016-07-07-south-africa-must-stand-
firm-with-india-the-pharmacy-of-the-developing-world [ https://perma.cc/8ZDP-CYBB]. 
68. Id. (author Claire Waterhouse is an access campaign officer for Doctors Without Borders 
(MSF) in Southern Africa). 
69. Id. 
70. SHRI JUSTICE N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, REPORT ON THE REVISION OF THE PATENTS 
LAW 3–4 (1959). 
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Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, wrote in the study, “are not created in the interest 
of the inventor but in the interest of national economy,” and “to secure the benefits 
thereof to the largest section of the public.”71 The Indian Patent Act of 1970 thus 
recognized patents in breakthrough chemical processes to make new drugs, but not 
in drug products themselves.72 This was, in fact, a common approach taken by many 
European countries at the time. The crucial decision to exclude product patents 
permitted a company to reverse engineer a drug product, to learn its underlying 
composition and technology, and to ultimately make the same drug, albeit in a 
different way. This spurred India’s generic drug industry. India would become one 
of the largest exporters of generic drugs throughout the world, including to the 
United States.73 
But India’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 1995 would doom this 
approach. TRIPS requires members to recognize patents in any inventions, whether 
products or processes, in all fields of technology.74 When India amended its law in 
2005 to comply with the TRIPS mandate, the legislature sought to utilize flexibilities 
within TRIPS to help generic drug manufacturing. Key to this was setting a high 
standard for patentability. The Indian Patent Amendment Act of 2005, for example, 
prohibits patents on mere modifications or tweaks on existing patents, thereby 
preventing what have come to be known as “evergreen” patents, where drug 
companies seek to extend their patents on weak grounds.75 
India’s approach to patentability can be seen in two recent events: (1) a change 
between the 2014 RCEP draft and the 2015 draft; and (2) a monumental Indian 
Supreme Court case. In the 2014 draft of the RCEP, Japan had sought to eliminate 
the ability of a country to challenge a patent “solely on the ground that the invention 
is a new form of a known substance which does not result in the enhancement of 
the known efficacy of that substance or that the invention is a new use for a known 
substance.”76 That proposal is absent from the 2015 draft text, perhaps because it 
would have contradicted India’s strict approach to patentability. The 2014 text 
would seem to have reversed the Indian Supreme Court’s interpretation of Indian 
patent law in a widely-cited 2013 case. In that case, India denied Novartis a patent 
on a new salt form of Gleevec, its blockbuster cancer drug, on the ground that the 
 
71. Id. at 12–13. 
72. Id. 
73. Caroline Chen & Anna Edney, Quicktake: Generic Drugs, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 18,  
2016, https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/generic-drugs [ https://web.archive.org/web/ 
20140924042102/https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/generic-drugs] (“India is the second-
largest exporter of drugs to the U.S., and almost half of active pharmaceutical ingredients used in the 
U.S. come from India or China.”). India is a large exporter by volume of medicines supplied, but not 
by value. In 2015, its share of global pharmaceutical exports by value was a mere 2.6 percent. WORLD 
TRADE ORG., supra note 29. 
74. TRIPS, supra note 46, art. 27. 
75. Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 5, Acts of Parliament, 2005 (India). 
76. Belinda Townsend, Deborah Gleeson & Ruth Lopert, The Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership, Intellectual Property Protection, and Access to Medicines, 28 ASIA PAC. J. PUB. HEALTH 682, 
684 (2016). 
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salt form was a mere modification of the old patented technology, without 
therapeutic benefit.77 Novartis had argued that some 40 countries had granted 
patents on the salt form of Gleevec, and that India’s patent standard was unfairly 
high.78 The Indian Supreme Court in 2013 affirmed the denial of Novartis’s patent, 
finding that Congress had sought through the patent law to prevent abusive 
practices such as “evergreening” by pharmaceutical companies.79 The Indian 
Supreme Court delivered its judgment cognizant “that an error of judgment . . . will 
put life-saving drugs beyond the reach of the multitude of ailing humanity not only 
in this country but in many developing and under-developed countries.”80 The same 
could be said of the text of the RCEP intellectual property chapter. 
B. Access to Education 
The relationship between access to education and intellectual property can 
perhaps best be seen through a lawsuit decided in 2016 in India. In 2012, three 
university presses—Oxford University Press (OUP), Cambridge University Press 
(CUP), and Taylor & Francis—sued the University of Delhi and Rameshwari 
Photocopy Service for copyright infringement for photocopying parts of their 
textbooks and distributing them in low cost course packs to students for a modest 
fee.81 The books at issue had an average price of 2,542 rupees, equivalent to about 
$42 USD—similar to the price charged in the West, but a price far out of the range 
of most students at the university.82 As Lawrence Liang explains, charging the same 
for a book published in the West as in India or South Africa is hard to justify; he 
writes, “if consumers in the United States had to pay the same proportion of their 
income towards these books as their counterparts in South Africa and India, the 
results would be . . . $1,027.50 for Mandela’s Long Walk to Freedom and $941.20 for 
the Oxford English Dictionary.”83 The Court found the course packs did not 
constitute copyright infringement because the activities fell under the education 
exception in Indian copyright law under section 52(1)(i) of the Indian Copyright 
Act (1957), which allows reproduction by a teacher or pupil in the course of 
instruction.84 The Court found that less than 9% of the original textbooks were used 
 
77. Id. at 686. 
78. Novartis Ag v. Union of India & Ors, (2013) 2706 SC 1311 (India). 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. Univ. of Oxford v. Rameshwari Photocopy Servs., 2016 AIR 81 (India). 
82. Id. An appeal to the Indian Supreme Court by the Indian Reprographic Rights Organization 
(IRRO) was rejected, leaving the Delhi High Court’s ruling intact. 
83. Lawrence Liang, Exceptions and Limitations in Indian Copyright Law for Education: An 
Assessment, Law and Development, 3 L. & DEV. REV. 197, 209 (2010). 
84. Anubha Sinha, Inside Views: Course Packs for Education Ruled Legal in India: Triumph  
for Access to Educational Materials, INTELL. PROP. WATCH, Dec. 7, 2017, http://www.ip-
watch.org/2017/07/12/course-packs-education-ruled-legal-india-huge-triumph-access-educational-
materials/ [ https://perma.cc/37HC-9V8A] (“In a liberal interpretation of the provision, the court held 
that the reproduction of a work is not limited to reproduction by an individual teacher or pupil, it also 
extends to the action of multiple teachers and students. Further, the court held that the phrase ‘course 
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in the course packs, which were sold to students at the modest price of less than a 
penny per page.85 This price put the books within reach for the students, who the 
Court held would not otherwise be able to afford educational materials.86 The Court 
noted that increased access to education would one day enable the very same 
students to purchase high-priced books.87 
Copyright, too, can have profound effects on human rights. Only a small 
fraction of the world’s books are made available to the 253 million persons in the 
world who are visually impaired.88 Copyright law can bar efforts to make books 
accessible to the visually impaired.89 The recent Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate 
Access to Published Works by Visually Impaired Persons and Persons with Print 
Disabilities signed in 2013 by some fifty countries allows for exceptions to 
copyrights to make otherwise protected works available to the visually impaired.90 
India was the first to ratify the Treaty—to date some thirty-seven countries have 
followed suit, and nearly eighty countries have signed it.91 The RCEP draft currently 
agrees to commit the member states to this agreement, which is especially critical to 
the region given that 90% of the world’s visually impaired persons live in the 
developing world, especially in south, east, and southeast Asia.92 
The RCEP draft proposes that member states “shall endeavour to provide an 
appropriate balance in its copyright and related rights system by providing 
limitations and exceptions . . . for legitimate purposes including education, research, 
criticism, comment, news reporting, libraries and archives and facilitating access for 
persons with disability.”93 There is no express mention of fair use of copyrighted 
works. The EFF observes that “RCEP fails to improve much on the TPP in areas 
 
of instruction’ embraces any instruction for the duration of an entire course or teaching programme, it 




88. Blindness and Visual Impairment, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Oct. 11, 2017),  
http://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/blindness-and-visual-impairment [https://perma.cc/ 
XUT6-Q2HS]. 
89. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., MAIN PROVISIONS AND BENEFITS OF  
THE MARRAKESH TREATY (2013) (2016), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_ 
marrakesh_flyer.pdf [ https://perma.cc/KC7K-M89Y]. 
90. Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, 
Visually Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled, June 27, 2013, 2 I.L.M. 255. 
91. Id.; 24. MARRAKESH TREATY TO FACILITATE ACCESS TO PUBLISHED WORKS FOR 
PERSONS WHO ARE BLIND, VISUALLY IMPAIRED OR OTHERWISE PRINT DISABLED (MARRAKESH 
2013): STATUS ON MAY 11, 2018 (2018), http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/treaties/en/
documents/pdf/marrakesh.pdf [ https://perma.cc/4QUR-Z9JN]. 
92. U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 12, at 7; Rupert R.A. Bourne et al., Magnitude, Temporal 
Trends, and Projections of the Global Prevalence of Blindness and Distance and Near Vision Impairment: 
A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 5 LANCET GLOBAL HEALTH e888, e892 (2017) (“The  
largest number of blind people resided in south Asia (11.7 million . . . ), followed by east Asia (6.2 
million . . . ) and southeast Asia (3.5 million . . . ). The largest number of people with moderate to  
severe vision impairment also resided in south Asia (61.2 million . . . ), followed by east Asia (52.9 
million . . . ), and southeast Asia (20.8 million . . . ).”). 
93. RCEP, supra note 34, art. 2.5. 
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where it quite easily could; most notably in the language on limitations and 
exceptions, which fails to require countries to include an equivalent to fair use in 
their copyright laws.”94 
The RCEP contains a number of proposals that would strengthen the rights 
of copyright owners and revise procedural rules and remedies in their favor. Japan 
and South Korea—joined this time by Australia—propose that judges must be able 
to award damages for intellectual property violations (including both copyright and 
patent violations) based on a product’s suggested retail price.95 As James Love has 
pointed out,96 this goes far beyond the TRIPS requirement that “the right holder 
shall be paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into 
account the economic value of the authorization.”97 “Economic value” may be 
significantly lower than the “suggested retail price” in developing countries where 
the suggested retail price is often not adjusted for local median income. 
In February 2017, a group of intellectual property scholars from around the 
world issued a “Statement of Public Interest Principles for Copyright Protection 
under the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).”98 The scholars 
urged the RCEP negotiators to consider the human rights implications of copyright 
protections, including “freedom of opinion and expression,” the “[promotion of] 
education, participation in the cultural life of the community, enjoyment of the arts, 
and sharing of scientific advancement and its benefits.”99 Urging that “RCEP 
negotiators should integrate the public interest as a core value for setting copyright 
provisions,” the statement recommends inclusion of a strong and express provision 
for “copyright limitations and exceptions, such as fair use and compulsory 
licensing,” and to “guarantee that the public interest in creativity, education, and 
free speech can be promoted through the necessary uses of copyrighted works.”100 
Elaborating further, the statement declares that copyright exceptions and limitations 
should be made available “for legitimate purposes such as criticism, comment, 
education, news reporting, parody, research, and facilitating access for persons with 
disability.”101 Finally, the statement by scholars calls for greater transparency in the 
RCEP negotiations so observers can ensure the agreement promotes the public 
 
94. Jeremy Malcolm, RCEP: The Other Closed-Door Agreement to Compromise Users’ Rights, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 20, 2016), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/04/rcep-
other-closed-door-agreement-compromise-users-rights [ https://perma.cc/7VXQ-R3JF]. 
95. RCEP, supra note 34, art. 9bis.2. 
96. Love, supra note 5. 
97. TRIPS, supra note 46, art. 31(h). 
98. HAOCHEN SUN, STATEMENT OF PUBLIC INTEREST PRINCIPLES FOR COPYRIGHT 
PROTECTION UNDER THE REGIONAL COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP (RCEP)  
(2017), https://www.eff.org/files/2017/02/23/rcep_statement_for_the_public_interest_final.pdf 
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interest, especially crucial given the vast numbers—half the world’s population—
and the huge proportion of the world’s poor to be affected.102 
 
II. ACCIDENTAL BENEFICIARIES OF THE RCEP: UNITED STATES AND 
EUROPEAN MULTINATIONALS 
It may come as a surprise to some of the ASEAN, Chinese, Indian, Japanese, 
and South Korean negotiators that by negotiating TRIPS-plus provisions in the 
RCEP, they are automatically granting those TRIPS-plus rights to United States and 
European companies. This is because, like GATT and GATS, the other principal 
WTO agreements, TRIPS contains most-favored-nations (MFN) and national 
treatment obligations.103 However, unlike GATT and GATS, TRIPS does not 
broadly exempt bilateral and regional free trade agreements from the application of 
MFN and national treatment.104 One expert pithily describes this as “regionalizing 
in GATT/GATS and multilateralizing in TRIPS.”105 Joost Pauwelyn demonstrates 
this principle by applying it to the United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement (FTA): 
 
102. Id. 
103. TRIPS, supra note 46, arts. 3–4. 
104. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Article XXIV exempts qualifying customs 
unions and free-trade areas from certain other GATT obligations, while GATS Article V exempts 
“economic integration agreements” from the GATS’ MFN obligation. General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]; General Agreement on 
Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183 [hereinafter GATS]. In Canada – Autos, the panel concluded that Canada 
could not rely on either GATT Article XXIV or GATS Article V to avoid providing MFN treatment 
to Japanese and European exporters because Canada’s measure failed to comply with the conditions 
for those exemptions. Appellate Body Report, Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Auto Industry, 
¶ 3, WTO Doc. WT/DS139/AB/R (adopted May 31, 2000). 
105. Marco M. Aleman, Impact of TRIPS-Plus Obligations in Economic Partnership- and Free 
Trade Agreements on International IP Law, in 20 MPI STUDIES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
COMPETITION LAW 61, 68 ( Josef Drexl et al. eds., 2014); id. at 83 (“TRIPS-plus provisions are 
immediately and unconditionally multilateralized through the MFN clause of TRIPS, which does not 
include the regional exception that exists for concessions concerning trade in goods and services.”). 
During the Uruguay Round negotiations, the European Communities proposed a regional trade 
agreement exception to the most-favored-nations and national treatment obligation. GATT Secretariat, 
Draft Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/
NG11/W/68, art. 4 (Mar. 29, 1990); GATT Secretariat, Draft Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG11/W/70, art. 3 (May 11, 1990) (applying 
“except for any advantage, favor, privilege, or immunity which exceeds the requirements of this 
Agreement and which is provided for in an international agreement to which the contracting party 
belongs, so long as such agreement is open for accession by any contracting party of this Agreement”). 
Developing countries were skeptical of the need to include an MFN principle in the text. GATT 
Secretariat, Meeting of the Negotiating Group of 1 November 1990, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG11/27, 
¶¶ 34 (Nov. 14, 1990) (“Speaking on behalf of a number of developing countries, a participant . . . 
said that he was still not convinced of the need to include the mfn principle in the text, since it was 
alien to the intellectual property system, and would in any case be rendered meaningless by the growing 
list of exceptions written into it.”). 
First to Printer_Chander & Sunder (Do Not Delete) 9/10/2018  10:41 AM 
2018] THE BATTLE TO DEFINE 351 
“[A]ny IP benefit conferred regionally between, for example, the US and Chile, 
must be extended automatically to all WTO members.”106 
The specific obligations are as follows. Under MFN, “[w]ith regard to the 
protection of intellectual property, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity 
granted by a Member to the nationals of any other country shall be accorded 
immediately and unconditionally to the nationals of all other Members . . . .”107 
Under national treatment, “Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other 
Members treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own nationals with 
regard to the protection of intellectual property.”108 A footnote makes clear that the 
national treatment and MFN obligations apply not only to intellectual property 
rights, but also to their enforcement: “For the purposes of Articles 3 [national 
treatment] and 4 [MFN], ‘protection’ shall include matters affecting the availability, 
acquisition, scope, maintenance and enforcement of intellectual property rights as 
well as those matters affecting the use of intellectual property rights specifically 
addressed in this Agreement.”109 In the report, United States – Section 211 Omnibus 
Appropriations Act of 1998, the Appellate Body agreed with the Panel that the 
appropriate standard to apply under Article 3.1 of TRIPS was whether a measure 
provided “effective equality of opportunities” to non-nationals.110 The result is 
plain: if China, India, Indonesia, and Thailand agree to strengthen intellectual 
property rights vis-à-vis each other or for their own nationals within the RCEP, they 
have automatically agreed to offer the same stronger rights to American and 
European corporations as well.111 
Thus, the greatest beneficiaries of the RCEP intellectual property chapter are likely to 
be United States and European companies. Those companies, after all, have the greatest 
stock of intellectual property to be protected.112 In promoting TRIPS-plus 
provisions in the RCEP, the South Korean and Japanese governments are 
effectively arguing on behalf of United States and European enterprise. 
An additional irony: Chinese, Indian, Japanese, and South Korean companies 
will not be guaranteed reciprocal rights in Europe or the United States. Any rights 
 
106. Joost Pauwelyn, Legal Avenues to ‘Multilateralizing Regionalism’: Beyond Article XXIV, in 
MULTILATERALIZING REGIONALISM 368, 38283 (Richard Baldwin & Patrick Low eds., 2009); see also 
Bryan Mercurio, TRIPS-Plus Provisions in FTAs: Recent Trends, in REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 215, 223 (Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino eds., 2006) (“[I]f the US 
and a developing country member negotiate an FTA, MFN will force the developing nation to make 
the same IP concessions it accepted in the FTA available to all nations.”). 
107. TRIPS, supra note 46, art. 4. 
108. Id. art. 3(1). 
109. Id. art. 3(1) n.3. 
110. Panel Report, United States—Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, ¶ 8.131, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS176/R (adopted Aug. 6, 2001); see also Appellate Body Report, United States—
Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, ¶ 258, WTO Doc. WT/DS176/AB/R (adopted  
Jan. 2, 2002). 
111. There is a substantial question as to whether the MFN and national treatment obligations 
would extend to the investor-state dispute resolution chapter. 
112. See infra notes 121-122 and accompanying text (describing global intellectual property 
royalty receipts, by country). 
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granted in those jurisdictions depend on their own laws and TRIPS-plus 
commitments, not on the rights given in the RCEP. Thus, the RCEP intellectual 
property chapter makes United States and European corporations free riders—
benefiting from its provisions, without their home jurisdictions facing any 
additional obligations.113 
Skeptics may ask: If this process is indeed the case, then what explains the 
United States’ zealous promotion of TRIPS-plus provisions in its free trade 
agreements? The answer may lie in the fact that, by and large, the United States is 
promoting provisions that are already part of its law. Thus, the addition of free trade 
agreement obligations does not in fact expand United States obligations to nationals 
of other WTO members because those foreign nationals already can claim those 
benefits by operation of national treatment.114 
The advantages to be extended under the MFN and national treatment 
obligations are mandated, in both cases, only with respect to “the protection of 
intellectual property.”115 This narrows these obligations somewhat as TRIPS 
defines “intellectual property” as “all categories of intellectual property that are the 
subject of Sections 1 through 7 of Part II” of TRIPS.116 Those particular sections 
protect copyright and related rights, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial 
designs, patents, designs of integrated circuits, and undisclosed information.117 
Thus, any part of the RCEP intellectual property chapter that does not protect those 
forms of intellectual property is not immediately available to nationals of all other 
WTO member states by operation of either MFN or national treatment. For the 
most part, however, the RCEP intellectual property chapter tracks the categories of 
TRIPS, so the bulk of the chapter would likely be subject to the MFN and national 
treatment obligations.118 The RCEP proposals on plant variety protection and on 
 
113. Focusing on United States efforts to establish TRIPS-plus provisions in its free trade 
agreements, Ruth Mayne observes that “the EC in effect is able to free-ride on the US bilateral strategy 
[through] the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) provision in TRIPS.” RUTH MAYNE, UNITED NATIONS 
DEV. PROGRAMME, REGIONALISM, BILATERALISM, AND “TRIPS PLUS” AGREEMENTS: THE 
THREAT TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 11 (2005), http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/
hdr2005_mayne_ruth_18.pdf [ https://perma.cc/EH7E-3HDF]. Europe can sit back and benefit from 
the sharp US negotiation, receiving “considerable commercial advantage without having to face the 
kind of international opprobrium faced by the US,” Mayne insightfully notes. Id. Mayne may not have 
anticipated that both Europe and the United States might be able to free-ride on Korean and Japanese 
efforts to achieve stronger protections in Asia. 
114. Mercurio, supra note 106, at 220 (“It is . . . clear that the TRIPS-Plus provisions appearing 
in US FTAs . . . are identical to aspects of its domestic law. . . . [T]he US law providing the President 
with the power to conclude trade agreements . . . [states as a negotiating objective] an IP regime that 
‘reflect(s) a standard found in United States law.’”). 
115. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
116. TRIPS, supra note 46, art. 1(2). The limitation to intellectual property rights recognized in 
the agreement leaves open the possibility of countries to offer new forms of rights—such as those for 
traditional knowledge—without automatically conferring them to all WTO members. 
117. Id. arts. 9–39. 
118. Whether some provisions are covered by TRIPS “intellectual property” will prove 
controversial in certain cases. For example, whether TRIPS requires data exclusivity has been subject 
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genetic resources, traditional knowledge, and folklore119 prove an exception to this 
rule because they have no TRIPS counterpart; thus, they would not be subject to 
the MFN and national treatment obligations. 
Yet another exception to the MFN obligation (but not the national treatment 
obligation) can be found in free trade agreements predating TRIPS, and duly 
notified to the TRIPS Council. This includes the intellectual property provisions in 
NAFTA, MERCOSUR, and the European Union (formerly European 
Communities), which have all been notified to the WTO.120 However, because the 
grandfather exclusion does not apply to national treatment, TRIPS-plus obligations 
in these regional arrangements will still be multilateralized through WTO member 
states because of the national treatment obligation. 
Strong intellectual property protections in the RCEP benefit United States 
and European companies in yet additional ways. First, as other nations in Asia join 
the RCEP, they will be required to accept the existing intellectual property 
protections in the agreement. Second, it will be difficult for the RCEP nations to 
reject such strong provisions in any future trade agreement with Europe or the 
United States when they have accepted them in such agreements already (and they 
are already effectively applicable to European and United States companies via the 
national treatment and MFN obligations). Third, such provisions will reduce the 
ability of the RCEP nations to manufacture generic medicines for either domestic 
use or export. 
Stronger intellectual property rights are likely to benefit the United States most 
of all, if past international intellectual property payments are a guide. The RCEP 
nations lag far behind the United States and the EU in receiving international 
payments on intellectual property, as Figure 4 shows. While the RCEP has been 
described as a counterweight to the United States, in fact, the intellectual property 
provisions in the RCEP may ultimately benefit United States and European 
 
to debate. Olasupo A. Owoeye, Data Exclusivity and Public Health Under the TRIPS Agreement, 23  
J.L. INFO. & SCI. 106, 111–12 (2014). 
119. RCEP, supra note 34, art. 5.19 (New Varieties of Plants); id. art. 7.1 (Genetic Resources, 
Traditional Knowledge, and Folklore). 
120. The United States only notified to the TRIPS Council a single article of NAFTA, while 
Mexico notified all of NAFTA’s intellectual property provisions. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, Notification Under Article 4(d) of the Agreement United States, WTO  
Doc. IP/N/4/USA/1 (Feb. 29, 1996); Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Notification Under Article 4(d) of the Agreement Mexico, WTO Doc. IP/N/4/MEX/1 (Feb. 12, 
1996). The European Communities’ notification seeks to exclude not only existing rights, but also 
“future acts adopted by the Community as such and/or by the Member States which conform with 
these agreements following the process of regional integration.” Council for Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, Notification Under Article 4(d) of the Agreement European Communities and 
their Member States, WTO Doc. IP/N/4/EEC/1 ( Jan. 29, 1996). The notification from Mercosur 
(established by the Treaty of Asunción in 1991) follows this model as well, covering “all agreements, 
protocols, decisions, resolutions and guidelines adopted or to be adopted in the future by MERCOSUR 
or its States Parties.” Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Notification 
Under Article 4(d) of the Agreement Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, WTO Doc. IP/N/4/ARG/
1, IP/N/4/BRA/1, IP/N/4/PRY/1, IP/N/4/URY/1 ( July 14, 1998). 
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companies. The European Union and the United States receive the great bulk of 
international royalties on intellectual property, some $125 billion and $122 billion 
USD respectively in 2016, according to World Bank statistics.121 Japan receives but 
a fraction of this amount, some $39 billion USD, and South Korea even less, at less 
than $7 billion USD, and the other RCEP countries report much smaller amounts, 
and some do not collect such statistics at all.122 South Korea and even the European 
Union, in fact, pay out more than they receive in international intellectual property 
payments. 
 
Figure 4. International Intellectual Property Receipts and Payments (2016) 




III. THE INTERNATIONAL TREATY-MAKING PROCESS 
The availability of a draft text of a major international treaty complete with 
annotations indicating precisely the language proposed or rejected by each 
negotiating partner offers an unusual glimpse into the treaty-making process. At the 
 
121. Data: Charges for the Use of Intellectual Property, Receipts, WORLD BANK,  
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.GSR.ROYL.CD?view=map [ https://perma.cc/WS68-
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same time, the very nature of this draft, representing a leaked chapter of the text, 
highlights another procedural aspect of the treaty-making process—the lack of 
planned transparency in international lawmaking related to intellectual property. We 
explore each aspect of the treaty-making process below. 
A. Idiosyncratic 
In the realist view, “international relations is essentially a story of Great Power 
politics.”123 The realist school understands international relations as a forum 
dominated by power politics, with each nation-state seeking to maximize its 
advantage through international fora. While earlier formulations focused on 
enhancing security,124 contemporary realists often adopt a wider cost-benefit 
framework for international obligations and engagements.125 Jack Goldsmith and 
Eric Posner offer what Greg Shaffer describes as “international relations 
realism.”126 States enter into international agreements not out of a sense of 
international obligation, but to maximize self-interest. Goldsmith and Posner argue 
that “international law emerges from states acting rationally to maximize their 
interests, given their perceptions of the interests of other states and the distribution 
of state power.”127 They recognize that domestic interest groups play a significant 
role in international trade negotiations in particular, and acknowledge that “elites, 
corporations, the military, relatives of dictators—have disproportionate influence 
on leaders’ conduct of state.”128 They also understand that “leaders’ information 
errors” and interest group capture can lead nations to fail to maximize rational self-
interest.129 
The negotiating text of the intellectual property chapter of the RCEP seems 
to confirm that the parties seek in large part to promote their self-interest in this 
international treaty-making process, though this conclusion must be hedged in two 
ways. At the macro level, India, home to a large generic medicine industry as well 
as poorer consumers, seeks to maintain its right to produce and export generic 
medicines. At the same time, South Korea and Japan, home of technology industries 
dependent on pharmaceutical and other patents as well as wealthier consumers, seek 
to restrict that right. 
 
123. Anne-Marie Slaughter & Thomas Hale, International Relations, Principal Theories, in MAX 
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2011). 
124. Robert Knowles, A Realist Defense of the Alien Tort Statute, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117, 
1141 (2011) (“[Classical realism] treats nations as single units with one overriding interest: their 
security.”). 
125. Jack Goldsmith & Daryl J. Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, 
Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1828 (2009) (“[N]ations create and comply with international law 
when, and only when, the perceived benefits of doing so outweigh the costs.”). 
126. Gregory Shaffer, The New Legal Realist Approach to International Law, 28 LEIDEN J. INT’L 
L. 189, 205 (2015). 
127. JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2005). 
128. Id. at 6. 
129. Id. at 206. 
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This initial evidence to support the rationalist claim proves more equivocal 
upon closer inspection. First, it is not clear that South Korea or Japan will in fact 
gain a net social benefit from stronger patent rights, given that they will be required 
to offer them simultaneously to United States and European companies—and thus 
face higher healthcare costs over the long term as they pay more in royalties for the 
intellectual property held by United States and European companies. 
Second, the realist claim only holds true at a very general level, one that is 
neither particularly controversial nor informative—and which largely replicates 
common sense. It does not seem to predict the particular language each side is 
proposing, accepting, or rejecting. Instead, a reading of the RCEP intellectual 
property draft chapter gives evidence for Kal Raustiala’s critique that the rationalist 
internationalist account “fails to explain much of the texture of international 
cooperation.”130 A purely political economy analysis might suggest a simple strategy: 
minimize intellectual property protections if one expects to be a net importer of 
intellectual property, or maximize intellectual protections if one expects to be a net 
exporter of intellectual property (this strategy could be further refined by type of 
intellectual property—copyrights, trademarks, patents, etc.). As Greg Mandel notes, 
“most countries will tend to be either net producers or net consumers of 
innovation.”131 If this is the case, there should largely be two positions in 
international intellectual property law negotiations—one arguing for weaker 
intellectual property protections, and the other seeking stronger protections, 
perhaps varied by the particular kind of intellectual property one’s nation exports 
or imports. Anthony Taubman notes the conventional view of intellectual property 
negotiations as being largely between “the industry interests of the North and the 
public policy interests of the South.”132 Thus, the rationalist might predict a unified 
front among intellectual property importers, and a similar front among intellectual 
property exporters (or perhaps united depending on the particular type of 
intellectual property at stake). 
A review of the RCEP leaked draft, however, reveals an astounding and 
seemingly inexplicable array of views on the details. At times, India will be aligned 
with Australia against South Korea and Japan (as predicted), and at other times, the 
alignments will be mixed—with little obvious explanation. If we understood South 
Korea and Japan as generally preferring the intellectual property maximalist 
position, we might expect them to consistently propose stricter enforcement 
provisions, while India proposes less demanding ones. The reality, however, seems 
reversed: while South Korea and Japan propose that remedies should be 
 
130. Kal Raustiala, Refining the Limits of International Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 423, 
424 (2006). 
131. Greg Mandel, Leveraging the International Economy of Intellectual Property, 75 OHIO  
ST. L.J. 733, 737 (2014). 
132. Anthony Taubman, Thematic Review: Negotiating “Trade-Related Aspects” of Intellectual 
Property Rights, in THE MAKING OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: PERSONAL INSIGHTS FROM THE 
URUGUAY ROUND NEGOTIATIONS 15, 22 ( Jayashree Watal & Anthony Taubman eds., 2015). 
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proportionate to the offense, India takes no view.133 While South Korea proposes 
statutory damages for copyright infringement and trademark counterfeiting, Japan 
opposes it.134 While China, Japan, and New Zealand propose worldwide novelty for 
patentability (though they each have quibbles with each other on the precise 
language), India and ASEAN oppose such a requirement; these positions are hard 
to square with the understanding that India seeks to raise the bar for patentability, 
while Japan seeks to lower it.135 
So how can we explain the various preferences of each country on specific 
language? A number of possible explanations might be assayed. First, particular 
wording may maximize domestic social welfare, as the rational choice theorists 
might suggest—for example, by lowering royalty payments made to foreigners or 
increasing royalty payments received from foreigners. Second, the specific wording 
might reflect the specific needs of particular constituencies, which, for example, 
might want stronger domestic and cross-border broadcasting rights. This differs 
from the first explanation because the constituency that has the ear of the trade 
negotiators may not capture the broader economic consequences for that nation; to 
take a non-intellectual property example, a country might advocate for investor-
state protection on behalf of its outward-bound investor companies, even while 
opening itself to ultimately larger inward-bound claims. Third, perhaps the specifics 
reflect the historically contingent content of local laws because negotiators might 
simply seek to reduce necessary conforming changes to domestic law as much as 
possible. Finally, the specifics might reflect the more idiosyncratic beliefs of 
individual negotiators. The reality is likely to consist in a mix of all of these 
rationales. 
Despite being described as a China-centered treaty, the RCEP’s intellectual 
property chapter does not show an especially active Beijing pen during the 
negotiation. Figure 5 below shows the number of times each country inserted a 














133. RCEP, supra note 34, arts. 9.2–9.3. 
134. Id. arts. 9bis.2–9bis.3. 
135. Id. art. 5.12. 
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Overall, it is possible to see strategies at work: India seeks to minimize 
intellectual property rights with respect to patent rights, while South Korea and 
Japan seeks to maximize enforcement of intellectual property rights across the 
region. But countries are not easy to predict on much of the language they prefer 
for specific provisions in the agreement. 
B. Secret 
The TPP was roundly and rightly criticized for being negotiated in secret, with 
no draft presented for public review till the negotiations had been concluded.136 As 
the negotiations came to a conclusion, reports would describe “senators and 
representatives, who are now allowed, under strictly controlled conditions—in a 
guarded basement room under the Capitol, with no note-taking—to read drafts of 
the eight-hundred-page agreement.”137 The RCEP is perhaps even less transparent 
 
136. Sean M. Flynn et al., The U.S. Proposal for an Intellectual Property Chapter in the Trans-
Pacific Partnership Agreement, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 105, 114 (2012) (“[T]he TPP . . . is being 
negotiated under intense secrecy, including an agreement among the parties that no text of any proposal 
in the negotiation will be released until four years after the end of the negotiation.”). 
137. William Finnegan, Why Does Obama Want This Trade Deal So Badly?, NEW  
YORKER, June 11, 2015, http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/why-does-obama- 
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than the TPP, with the public forced to rely on leaked texts of a few chapters 
published by the civil society group Knowledge Ecology International.138 
Defenders of the TPP note that trade negotiation is usually conducted in 
secret. The rationale for such secrecy is that the industries whose protections are 
being reduced or eliminated should not learn of this plan for fear that they might 
be able to mount an effective opposition, scuttling trade liberalization 
negotiations.139 
However, that rationale for secrecy does not apply to the intellectual property 
provisions of trade agreements. The intellectual property chapter does not consist 
in the dismantling of protectionism; rather it consists in establishing the contours 
of intellectual property protections. There is no trade liberalization that is allegedly 
put in jeopardy by disclosure of what is contemplated in the intellectual property 
chapters.140 That does not mean that domestic constituencies might not protest 
when proposed terms are disclosed. Local publishers, local generics manufacturers, 
or local medical agencies might complain of strong TRIPS-plus rights, while other 
publishers and pharmaceutical companies might complain that the provisions are 
not strict enough. 
Secrecy in negotiating trade deals is, moreover, a poor strategy, even for the 
substantive trade liberalization provisions.141 First, practically speaking, in a world 
of leaks, when texts are being negotiated among a dozen or more countries, it may 
 
138. For a collection of the leaked chapters of RCEP, see RCEP Leaks, BILATERALS.ORG, 
http://www.bilaterals.org/rcep-leaks [ https://perma.cc/F952-FGPT] (last visited June 14, 2018). 
139. Panagiotis Delimatsis, TTIP, CETA, and TiSA Behind Closed Doors: Transparency in  
the EU Trade Policy, in MEGA-REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: CETA, TTIP, AND TISA  
216, 244 (Stefan Griller et al. eds., 2017) (“Excessive transparency upfront . . . may delay negotiations 
and . . . prompt trade negotiators to posture by taking uncompromising positions . . . [because of ]  
domestic constituencies monitoring such international developments . . .”); EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
THE ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT (ACTA) FACT SHEET 4 (2008),  
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/october/tradoc_140836.11.08.pdf [ https://perma.cc/ 
B6Q3-9FLT] (“For reasons of efficiency, it is only natural that intergovernmental negotiations dealing 
with issues that have an economic impact, do not take place in public and that negotiators are bound 
by a certain level of discretion.”). Sometimes “national security” is asserted. See David S. Levine Bring 
in the Nerds: Secrecy, National Security, and the Creation of International Intellectual Property Law, 30 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 105, 109 (2012). 
140. This is not to suggest that secrecy is likely to prove beneficial to achieving trade 
liberalization in goods and services. In fact, secrecy in the negotiations of goods, services, and 
intellectual property is likely to be counter-productive because it “increases rather than decreases 
controversy so that whatever final text arrives from the process will be received by the public and their 
representatives with derision.” Flynn et al., supra note 136, at 201. 
141. The United States Chamber of Commerce’s defense of secrecy in negotiations—that 
“disclosure of negotiating texts would risk giving foreign governments a roadmap to  
U.S. sensitivities”—seems inapposite as negotiating texts necessarily are disclosed to foreign 
governments involved in the negotiation (and eventually to all other foreign governments when they 
are ratified). John G. Murphy, New York Times Op-Ed Attacking Secrecy in Trade Negotiations Misses 
Mark, U.S. CHAMBER COM.: ABOVE FOLD (Apr. 15, 2015), https://www.uschamber.com/above-
the-fold/new-york-times-op-ed-attacking-secrecy-trade-negotiations-misses-mark [ https://perma.cc/ 
XQJ7-8VYA]. Secrecy in trade negotiations is not about keeping secrets from foreign governments, 
but about keeping secrets from domestic interests. 
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be difficult to maintain secrecy, as recent events have demonstrated.142 Second, early 
disclosure may stave off manipulative disclosures timed and drafted to make the 
text look scandalous. Third, the secrecy of the process becomes a key focal point of 
critics of the agreement. Finally, a secret process makes it impossible to include civil 
society in the negotiations, which may help produce provisions that are more widely 
acceptable and balanced.143 
CONCLUSION 
The negotiation of an Asia-Pacific trade agreement represents an opportunity 
for developing and recently developed countries to set a new agenda for intellectual 
property—one focused not just on protecting property rights, but on ensuring 
access to medicine and access to knowledge. At present, the RCEP fails to make a 
start towards such goals, and, if some parties prevail in the negotiation, will in fact 
impede them. In lieu of the current intellectual property chapter, countries in the 
region could instead agree to a new funding mechanism to find treatments for the 
diseases of the developing world—perhaps borrowing as inspiration the newly-
established Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.144 Scholars have increasingly 
recognized the usefulness of prizes and grants as a mechanism to spur innovation 
along useful lines.145 If it includes an intellectual property chapter at all, the RCEP 
 
142. See, e.g., TRADE LEAKS, https://trade-leaks.org/ [ https://perma.cc/WH2V-P3KX] 
(last visited June 14, 2018); WIKILEAKS, https://wikileaks.org/ [ https://perma.cc/T6RT-AG2R] 
(last visited June 14, 2018); see also David S. Levine, Transparency Soup: The ACTA Negotiating Process 
and “Black Box” Lawmaking, 26 AM. U. INT’L. L. REV. 811, 829 (2011) (“Because the Internet exists 
as a pervasive means to disseminate information on issues of significant public concern, the remainder 
of this paper suggests that the benefit of secrecy is difficult, and in some cases impossible, to maintain 
when (1) an issue of significant national interest is receiving national attention, and (2) there is an 
organized and technologically-savvy group of interested members of the public that are not receiving 
desired information about the issue.”). 
143. Civil society has long called for transparency in trade negotiations. See, e.g.,  
IGF DYNAMIC COAL. ON TRADE & THE INTERNET, RESOLUTION ON TRANSPARENCY  
(2017), https://www.eff.org/files/2017/12/19/igf_dc_trade_resolution_on_transparency.pdf 
[ https://perma.cc/987J-8DRU]. Even some corporations have joined the call. See, e.g., David Weller, 
Bringing Internet Voices into Trade, GOOGLE: PUBLIC POLICY (Mar. 25, 2016), https://blog.google/
topics/public-policy/bringing-internet-voices-into-trade/ [ https://perma.cc/3URA-2UB5] (“For 
trade and Internet policy to work together, trade negotiators need to have input from the full range of 
Internet stakeholders.”). 
144. See, e.g., Tim Hubbard & James Love, A New Trade Framework for Global Healthcare 
R&D, 2 PLOS BIOL. 147 (2004). 
145. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115 (2003); 
Jonathan H. Adler, Eyes on a Climate Prize: Rewarding Energy Innovation to Achieve Climate 
Stabilization, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2011); Michael J. Burstein & Fiona E. Murray, Innovation 
Prizes in Practice and Theory, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401 (2016); Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa L. Ouellette, 
Beyond the Patents—Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303 (2013) (comparing various schemes to promote 
innovation, including patents, prizes, grants, and tax incentives); Benjamin N. Roin, Intellectual Property 
Versus Prizes: Reframing the Debate, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 999, 1001–03 (2014); Steven Shavell & Tanguy 
van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525 (2001); Ted 
Sichelman, Patents, Prizes, and Property, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 279, 279–80 (2017). The principal 
criticism of prize and grant mechanisms as an innovation tool is that governments lack sufficient 
information to guide innovation. But if the governments’ goals are well-defined—say to develop cures 
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should create a new model of intellectual property agreement, devoted not to 
promoting intellectual property first and foremost and for its own sake, but to 
promoting health, education, and innovation. The sixteen countries negotiating the 







































for a particular illness, or to improve methods to deliver medicines, say, in tropical climates—this 
particular defect can be ameliorated. 
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